Grants Versus Tax Sharing : The Extent of Central Government Control by Roy, Graeme
Roy, Graeme (2006) Grants Versus Tax Sharing : The Extent of Central 
Government Control. Discussion paper. University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/67735/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRATHCLYDE 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS IN 
ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRANTS VERSUS TAX SHARING: THE EXTENT OF 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
 
BY 
 
GRAEME ROY 
 
 
No. 06-05 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE 
GLASGOW 
 
 
 
 
 Grants versus Tax Sharing: The Extent of Central Government 
GRAEME ROY* 
[Uni de] 
 
Abstract
Control 
 
 
 
versity of Strathcly
 
 
 
 
 
hroughout the OECD, regional and local governments typically rely heavily upon 
EL Codes: H60, H70, H77 
_______________________________________
T
transfers from their national governments to finance their day to day expenditures. While 
grants remain the most popular method of transferring resources from the centre to the 
sub-centre, the potential for greater use of tax sharing agreements has received 
considerable attention in recent years. A key aspect of this debate and of the fiscal 
decentralisation literature more generally, is the attempt to strike a balance between on 
the one hand, sub-central government freedom and accountability and on the other, 
macroeconomic stability. This paper assesses the relative ability of the centre to control 
national fiscal policy in an effort to re-balance the budget during periods of fiscal crisis. 
We compare and contrast the resources available to central governments when faced with 
a need to consolidate across various decentralisation regimes, demonstrating that, 
contrary to established thinking, grants and tax sharing imply two very different levels of 
central authority.    
 
 
J
 
 
 
 
 
_  
onal Agglomeration, Growth and Multilevel 
@strath.ac.uk 
 
* The author would like to thank participants at the Regi
Governance Workshop at the University of Ghent in November 2005 and seminars at the Universities 
of Glasgow and Strathclyde for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The author 
gratefully acknowledges funding under the ESRC Postdoctoral Fellowship scheme  Award Number 
PTA-026-27-1059. 
Email: graeme.d.roy
1.  Introduction 
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The recent trend in many countries towards greater political and fiscal decentralisation 
has re-ignited the debate on the appropriate level and form of financial autonomy for sub-
central governments. Greater fiscal responsibilities can lead to more popular and efficient 
local public services but, as the recent fiscal crises in Latin America have shown, the 
failure to monitor and discipline potentially profligate sub-central governments can lead 
to serious macroeconomic problems.  
 
As Figure 1 highlights, sub-central expenditures universally outweigh own-source 
revenues (i.e. revenues over which the sub-centre has full discretion). To plug this gap, 
two forms of central to sub-central intergovernmental transfers are used; grants and tax 
sharing. This vertical imbalance implies that, even in countries with high levels of 
expenditure decentralisation, the central/federal government can retain a sizeable degree 
of de-facto or effective control over sub-central fiscal policy. By tightening transfers the 
centre is able to force the hand of local politicians to cut their expenditures (or to 
increase the limited revenues at their disposal) and vice versa.    
 
Figure 1:  Sub-Central Expenditure and Autonomous Revenue  
(% of General Government totals) 
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Source:  IMF GFS (2002), Stegarescu (2005) and own calculations. 
 
Given the current interest in devolution, it is surprising that while much of the fiscal 
decentralisation/federalism literature has centred upon the normative implications of 
devolved expenditures and revenues (see Darby et al. (2003) for a survey), there has been 
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very little discussion on the practicalities of alternative decentralisation regimes (i.e. 
revenue autonomy, grant finance, tax sharing etc). As a result, a number of important 
questions remain unanswered. For example, how does the relationship between the centre 
and the sub-centre differ according to the financial regime in place? Is a system of tax 
sharing more efficient than grants? Does the level of central control over the sub-centre 
differ according to the type of transfer mechanism? This debate is important as in many 
countries, including the UK, dissatisfaction with the historical reliance upon grants to 
finance devolved and local governments has been growing in recent years - see for 
example Hallwood and MacDonald (2005 and 2006) and The Economist (2006). In this 
paper, we attempt to address some of these issues.     
 
Grants take the form of a direct transfer of money from the centre to the sub-centre while 
tax sharing revenues represent shared withdrawals by both the centre and the sub-centre 
from a common tax base. As discussed in Rodden (2002 and 2003) and Stegarescu 
(2005), in reality the ability of the sub-centre to influence the revenues they receive from 
grants and tax sharing tend to be heavily constrained. Instead, it is the central government 
that controls the mechanisms to increase or decrease the amount of money allocated 
annually to sub-central governments1.  
 
Under a system of intergovernmental grants, while it is possible for sub-central 
governments to request additional funding support, the centre ultimately decides on the 
level of revenue to be transferred. In practice, with tax sharing even though the scenario is 
slightly different, the end result is identical. In countries with substantial tax sharing 
regimes, such as Germany, Austria and Belgium, the shares of total tax revenue each 
tier receives are fixed either by formal legislation, constitutional amendments, means-
tested formulas and/or historical allocations, while the centre retains control over both the 
tax base and the tax rate of the commonly shared revenue source  see Stegarescu (2005). 
Consequently, sub-central governments have little or no authority to alter these revenues, 
depending instead upon the annual decisions of the centre to maintain or alter the total tax 
take and the pre-determined formulas to allocate these revenues. By altering the tax rate 
or base, the centre is able to force the hand of sub-central governments into expenditure 
cuts.  
 
                                                          
1 In addition, central governments can often exert influence on sub-central spending patterns through 
directives, expenditure targets, spending guidelines and so forth. These further reduce the autonomy of 
sub-central governments. While important, the focus of this paper is on sub-central revenues and 
therefore we do not discuss such mechanisms in great detail.  
 3
It follows therefore, that in terms of the degree of central control and sub-central 
autonomy, tax sharing and grants appear at a first glance to be identical. Indeed, it has 
been argued by many in the academic literature including Pola (1999), Ebel and Yilmaz 
(2002) and Rodden (2003), that empirical research should treat these two types of revenue 
symmetrically. A similar conclusion has also been reached at the policy level. In 
Recommendation Rec(2005)1 from the Council of Europes Committee of Ministers 
meeting, January 19th 2005 it was formally deemed that the type of shared taxes in which 
central government retains the control over the tax rate and tax base; according to 
Recommendation Rec(2005)1, these non exclusive fiscal resources are financial transfers; 
if they are not in direct relation to the amounts collected locally, then they are also 
considered as grants2.  
 
In this paper however, we demonstrate that there are important differences between grants 
and tax sharing which have significant implications for the centres ability to respond to 
macroeconomic shocks. More specifically, we assess the policy instruments available to 
central governments when faced with an urgent requirement to balance the national 
budget. We argue that while the degree of sub-central dependence upon the centre is 
similar irrespective of the source of intergovernmental transfer, in most circumstances the 
degree of central control differs markedly between tax sharing and grants. In short, with 
the exception of a special case, we show that for a given level of sub-central expenditure, 
central governments have a greater degree of effective control over sub-central and hence 
national fiscal policy under grants than they do under tax sharing. This subtle distinction 
between sub-central dependence and central control has been largely overlooked in the 
literature to date. The ability of central governments to respond to macroeconomic shocks 
and episodes of fiscal stress would be reduced if grants were to be replaced with tax 
sharing.  
 
This result has a number of important implications. Firstly, at the policy level it suggests 
an additional key distinction between tax sharing and grants which must be taken into 
account when considering how best to finance sub-central expenditures. As mentioned 
above, in recent years the reliance upon grants as the primary source of intergovernmental 
transfer mechanism has been criticised with many economists advocating greater use of 
tax sharing. While recognising many of the advantages of tax sharing systems, such as 
improved incentive mechanisms for local politicians, our result indicates that a switch to 
                                                          
2 See EC (2005) and OECD (2006).  
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tax sharing would reduce the ability of the central government to stabilise the 
macroeconomy and/or national budget. Consequently, additional institutional frameworks 
may be required to guard against potential instability. Secondly, from an academic 
research viewpoint our analysis implies that the recent trend in the empirical literature to 
lump together revenues from tax sharing and grants (see for example Rodden (2002 & 
2003) and Fiva (2005)) might not always be appropriate. Our analysis suggest that this 
approach is valid only if ones focus is upon the degree of sub-central autonomy within a 
country but that it is inappropriate if ones interest is in the extent of central control over 
sub-central fiscal policy and/or national fiscal policy management. A clear distinction 
between the two has to be made.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly discuss grants and tax 
sharing while Section 3 conducts our formal analysis by examining the degree of 
effective central control over national fiscal policy under various decentralisation 
regimes. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2.  Grants and Tax Sharing 
 
While there are numerous types of grants, all of them share the key feature of 
representing a direct transfer of revenues from the centre to sub-central governments. 
Block grants are typically aimed at addressing vertical (i.e. between tiers of government) 
and horizontal (i.e. between individual sub-central governments) imbalances. In contrast, 
matching and specific grants are used by central governments to target specific policy 
areas which, while not under their direct control, are deemed to be of social, economic or 
political importance at the national level. With block grants, sub-central governments 
typically have considerable discretion to allocate the money transferred. In matching and 
specific grants discretion is much more limited.   
 
Historically, grants have been the most popular method of transferring resources between 
governments and as Figure 2 demonstrates, this remains the case in many OECD 
countries.  
 
 
Figure 2:  Composition of Sub-Central Government Revenues 
(as a percentage of their Total Revenues) 
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Source:  IMF Government Finance Statistics (2002 edition).3  
 
Tax sharing occurs when two or more tiers of government split the total national tax yield 
from a particular tax. (See Figure 3 for a summary of tax sharing and own source taxation 
in a selection of OECD countries.) A hypothetical example of a shared tax system would 
be national income tax whereby the centre receives 75% of all income tax receipts and the 
sub-centre 25%.  
 
As we will demonstrate, the ability of the centre to alter the shares of the total tax take 
(i.e. the split of the tax revenue allocated to each tier; 50:50, 75:25 etc) is critical in 
determining the degree of effective control over sub-central fiscal policy. Stegarescu 
(2005) shows that in the OECD, virtually all tax sharing regimes involve legislatively 
fixed tax shares. In fact, out of the 23 countries surveyed, Belgium was the only country 
where the central government was able to unilaterally alter the revenue-split over certain 
elements of taxation in the annual budget process and even then, such revenues only 
contribute around 0.3% to the total sub-central budget. In other countries such as Greece, 
Portugal and Finland, while the central government is able to alter the revenue-split, to do 
so requires primary legislation independent of the annual budget. Again, the total budget 
contributions are small. Instead, revenue sharing flows are almost always determined by 
constitutional or other stable formulae Rodden (2002), and legislation to alter these 
allocations often requires constitutional amendments and/or the agreement of the sub-
central authorities, Stegarescu (2005).  
                                                          
3 In Figure 2, tax  includes both tax sharing and own-source tax revenues.  
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 Figure 3:  Degree of Tax Revenue Decentralisation 1999 – 2001 
(as a percentage of their Total Revenues) 
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Source:  Stegarescu (2005) 
 
In fact, it is often desirable to impose fixed long-term revenue splits in tax sharing 
systems. The primary argument in favour of tax sharing vis-à-vis grants is that tax sharing 
can better facilitate regional development by providing positive incentives for local 
politicians to boost the tax base/economic growth within their jurisdiction. Policies and 
innovations which improve the tax base within their region (for example policies which 
encourage inward migration, innovation, business start-ups etc) increase the revenues 
they receive, while policies which harm the tax base reduce revenues. In contrast, no such 
incentive mechanisms tend to be in place in grant systems and a dependency culture can 
emerge  see The Economist (2006) for a critique of the funding of UK devolution.   
 
When sharing revenues from Income Tax, Business Tax etc, improvements in regional 
economic performance (and hence the tax base) bring about direct increases in regional 
taxation equal to the increase in the total tax take multiplied by the regional governments 
respective share.  However, a critical component of this incentive mechanism is the 
belief on the part of regional politicians that the additional revenues raised through 
improved regional economic performance will not be captured by the centre. Without pre-
determined fixed shares, the centre could continually alter the shares they and the sub-
central governments receive so that following any increase in the regional tax base (and 
hence total tax revenue for a given constant tax rate), the amount allocated to sub-central 
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governments would not change, with the centre capturing the additional resources instead. 
Clearly, in such a scenario, the incentive effects provided by tax sharing are lost. 
Furthermore, the EU recommends that in general, [tax sharing systems] should be 
provided for by law or decided on in the light of clear criteria laid down by law. The 
governments discretion in calculating and effecting transfers should be reduced in order 
to avoid objectivity and credibility problems, EC (2005).  
 
Piggy-back or overlapping taxes are sometimes referred to in the literature as tax 
sharing. With such taxes, common in Scandinavia, sub-central governments are permitted 
within limits to alter the tax rate (but not the tax base) set by the centre. For example in 
Norway, the central government sets an upper limit for local income tax rates and local 
governments are permitted to raise income tax within their jurisdiction to this limit4. 
Strictly speaking these revenues are slightly different from the tax sharing systems looked 
at in this paper, nevertheless, as we will see our analysis can be extended to such taxes.   
 
3.  Measuring the Degree of Effective Central Control 
3.1  The Basic Framework 
 
In order to highlight the differences in effective central control under alternative 
decentralisation regimes, we construct a simple stylised budgetary accounting framework. 
While many of the assumptions are undeniably unrealistic, their use serves to highlight 
the important differences between the various decentralisation regimes and more 
specifically, the  ability of the central government to manage national fiscal policy in 
times of fiscal and/or macroeconomic stress. More complex models are possible but the 
advantage of our approach is in the clear illustration of the key issues without becoming 
distracted by discussions of unnecessary complications.     
 
The focus of the paper is upon the extent of central control during periods of 
macroeconomic reform5. More specifically, we examine national fiscal consolidation 
attempts, defined as a deliberate effort by the central government to substantially reduce 
the national fiscal deficit or increase the surplus6. Our motivation for this approach is two 
fold. Firstly, by adopting this methodology we are best placed to highlight the subtle 
                                                          
4 Figure 3 does not distinguish between such taxes and truly autonomous taxes.  
5 The impact of decentralisation on economic reforms is discussed in Treisman (1999). 
6 In Europe especially, fiscal consolidations, their implications and the factors which contribute to their 
success, remain highly relevant as countries tackle weakening fiscal positions and ageing populations.     
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differences between grants and tax sharing and secondly, by focussing on a particular 
case study we can clearly observe the important implications of our analysis from both a 
theoretical and practical viewpoint.  
 
We begin by assuming that there are two tiers of government, the centre (C) and the sub-
centre (S)7. Each tier of government undertakes expenditure (E), denoted CE and SE 
respectively. We assume that central expenditure (CE) is comprised of two components: 
non-cyclical (or autonomous) expenditure D and cyclical expenditure E(y): where y is the 
deviation in output from the natural rate (y = lnY- lnY*). Thus, in this simple framework 
with a zero output gap, cyclical expenditures are zero. For simplicity we assume that the 
parameter E is fixed and that government expenditures do not impact on output. By 
implication, the central government only has discretionary control over the non-cyclical 
component of their expenditures D. Thus CE can be defined as: 
 
CE y D E( )     (1.1) 
where,  'dCE y
dy
E  0
                                                          
   (1.2) 
 
We assume that while output directly affects the fiscal balance, changes in fiscal policy 
have no immediate impact on output. The inclusion of output in this way is simply to 
generate a negative fiscal position that requires action. We could for example let fiscal 
policy affect output but in a way in which would retain a negative fiscal balance or we 
could simply assume that the central fiscal position is negative at the outset and 
adjustment is necessary, perhaps to meet EMU criteria.  
 
In contrast, and without loss of generality, we assume that sub-central expenditure (SE) is 
not influenced by the economic cycle8. Both SE and CE represent current expenditures; 
there are no capital investments.  
The centre raises revenue through taxation CT, which can also be broken into non-
cyclical and cyclical taxation components, G and M(y) respectively9. Thus CT can be 
defined as  
7 For simplicity we assume that there is only one sub-central government; the number of sub-central 
governments is unimportant. Our goal is to demonstrate the level of central control over the sub-central 
tier as a whole, irrespective of the number of sub-central units.  
8 Again, this assumption aids simplification but does not alter the key parts of our analysis. The 
standard fiscal federalism literature (for example, Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972)) argues that sub-
central fiscal policy should be a-cyclical, with stabilisation reserved for central governments. For an 
empirical study of the cyclicality of sub-central fiscal policy see Wibbels and Rodden (2005).  
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 CT y G Mb g      (1.3) 
where,  'dCT y
dy
M ! 0    (1.4) 
 
In contrast, the sub-centre raises their revenue (SR) either through own-source non-
cyclical taxation (ST) or via inter-governmental transfers. The latter can either be in the 
form of grants (SG) or via revenues from tax sharing (STshare) arrangements. For 
simplicity, we assume that under each scenario (e.g. grants, full decentralisation etc), all 
sub-central revenues (SR) are raised from a particular single source, e.g. autonomous 
taxation, grants etc.   
 
To complete the budgetary framework we assume that the nation cannot issue debt. Given 
the assumption of zero capital goods and the lack of a dynamic framework, this translates 
itself into a simple balanced national/general budget requirement. However, a fiscal 
deficit within a particular tier of government can be financed by a parallel surplus at the 
other tier. Thus for example, sub-central governments could run a deficit provided that 
the centre agreed to fully finance these excess expenditures by central revenues or vice 
versa10.  
 
We assume that the centre has a pre-determined optimal level of both autonomous 
expenditure and revenue denoted D  and G  respectively. Similarly they have pre-
determined optimal levels of sub-central expenditure ( SE ) and revenue ( SR ). Given 
that central governments are accountable to the national electorate, and are ultimately 
responsible for macroeconomic stability, they are likely to have an optimal preference for 
the sub-central policy stance which may or may not be consistent with the sub-centres 
preferences. In the UK for example, much of local government reform over the last two 
decades has been in response to policies being pursued by local governments which were 
inconsistent with those of the centre. These reforms have clearly been designed to give 
the Westminster government greater control thereby reducing conflict over policy11.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 As with expenditure, y is the deviation in national income from the natural rate (y = Y-Y*) and the 
parameter M is assumed to be fixed. 
10 In such a scenario, the resources from the central governments fiscal surplus can be transferred to 
the sub-centre. Without this additional transfer, sub-central expenditures (revenues) would have to be 
cut (increased).   
11 The frequent use of capping powers on the autonomous tax revenues of UK Local Governments is a 
prime example  see Emmerson et al. (1998).  
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In contrast, the sub-central tier is assumed to have optimal levels of their own 
expenditure and revenue, SE and SR  but has no concern over the level of central 
government expenditure and revenue. This final assumption is not critical and our 
analysis would not alter if we specified an optimal level of central expenditure/revenue 
from the viewpoint of sub-central politicians. In this case, sub-central politicians may 
favour higher or lower central expenditures etc as they have no means of influencing the 
fiscal decisions of the centre given that the intergovernmental financial transfers only 
flow from the centre to the sub-centre and not vice versa. In practice, sub-central 
politicians tend to have limited control over central government fiscal policy and for the 
most part, with some exceptions, are likely to be most concerned with the 
expenditures/revenues within their local jurisdiction.  
 
Given the likelihood of different preferences and political motivations etc, optimal sub-
central expenditures as viewed by the sub-centre may not necessarily coincide with the 
equivalent optimal level preferred by the centre (i.e. SE SEand SR SR , z z
E
). We assume 
that each government's preferences for expenditure and revenue are single-peaked12.   
 
The general government (or national) fiscal balance can be written as follows: 
 
G CT SR CE Sbal        (1.5) 
 
which by substituting 1.1 and 1.3 can be re-arranged to give: 
 
G y SR y SEbal      G M D Eb g b g   (1.6) 
 
To analyse the budgetary accounting implications of alternative fiscal decentralisation 
structures during consolidation attempts, we introduce a negative output shock. This 
forces firstly the central government and then by implication, the general government 
fiscal positions into deficit. Given our constraint that the general government fiscal 
position must always be in balance, consolidation is required.   
 
To illustrate this, suppose that initially both the central and sub-central fiscal positions are 
balanced but there is a negative shock to output ys where ys<0. Consequently, given 
equations (1.1) and (1.3), central government expenditures will rise (by the amount E(ys)), 
                                                          
12 Therefore, if actual expenditure differs from optimal expenditure any policy option which will more 
closely align the two will be adopted.   
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while central tax revenues will fall (by the amount M(ys)). Thus, Gbal given by (1.6) will 
be negative and hence a national consolidation to expenditures and revenues is necessary 
(either at the central, sub-central or both tiers of government) - i.e.    
 
    0s sbalG y SR y SEG M D E         (1.6a) 
 
In what follows we compare and contrast the ability of the central government to respond 
to this situation by examining the policy instruments available to them under alternative 
sub-central financial arrangements.  
 
3.2 Centralisation
 
In the first scenario we assume that all fiscal instruments are assigned to the central level 
 i.e. there is no decentralisation. In this case, the expenditure and revenue denoted SE 
and SR are effectively individual components of discretionary central government 
expenditure and revenue. Thus, central government has direct control over both their 
own instruments G and D, but in addition, sub-central expenditure and revenue (SE and 
SR). Given the preferences of the central government discussed above, these expenditures 
and revenues will initially be set equal to SE and SR respectively.  
 
Following the negative output shock the central fiscal balance will be negative:   
 
    0s sbalC y yG M D E        (2.1) 
 
which in turn feeds through to a negative general government balance:  
 
    0s sbalG y SR y SEG M D E         (2.2) 
 
In such a situation the central government has a number of fiscal instruments it can use to 
restore general balance. Firstly, the centre can adjust their own non-cyclical 
expenditures and revenues denoted by G and D respectively. By increasing G and cutting D 
by appropriate amounts they can restore equilibrium. Secondly a surplus can be generated 
on the sub-central balance, compensating for the deficit at the central level: i.e.   
 
SC SR SEbal
new new  ! 0     (2.3) 
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 where it is possible that,  
 
  C SCbal bal new      (2.4) 
 
Thus the centre has the ability to adjust both their own expenditures and revenues 
together with those of the sub-centre. Clearly this simple framework cannot determine the 
actual composition of the adjustment (the exact change will depend upon utility costs 
associated with moving away from optimal levels of central and sub-central 
expenditures and revenues). It is sufficient to note however, that under a system of 
centralisation the centre is able to effectively control both central and sub-central 
instruments to assist in any national fiscal adjustment.  
 
The case of full centralisation is a useful benchmark against which alternative scenarios 
of decentralisation can be compared. We begin with the polar opposite case, full 
autonomous fiscal decentralisation.  
 
3.3 Full Decentralisation
 
Under full decentralisation, the sub-central tier has complete fiscal autonomy in that their 
expenditures (SE) are financed entirely from own-source taxation (ST).  
 
In this scenario, the sub-central government will set SE = SE  in line with their pre-
determined exogenous preferences. Consequently, given their inability to issue debt this 
implies an optimal level of revenue SR = ST  so that, SE = ST . In such a scenario, the 
general government budget balance,   
 
G y SR ybal       SEG M D Eb g b g   (3.1) 
where, SR = ST  and SE = SE  can be re-written to give,   
 
G y ST ybal      G M D Eb g b g SE   (3.2) 
 
Given SE = ST , the general government fiscal position in equilibrium becomes,  
 
G ybal    G M D Eb g b gy    (3.2) 
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 As before, following a shock to output, the central fiscal balance is negative, forcing the 
general government balance (3.2) to also be negative:  
 
     0s sbalG y ST y SEG M D E        (3.2a) 
 
and given SE = ST , 
 
    0s sbalG y yG M D E        (3.2b) 
  
In contrast to the situation under full centralisation, the central governments ability to 
respond to the shock is more constrained. The centre is unable to run a surplus on the sub-
central fiscal position to help finance their deficit brought on by the negative shock to 
output. Under full fiscal autonomy, any such surplus is run at the discretionary will of the 
sub-centre. However, from the sub-centres perspective, their fiscal policy has been 
unaffected by the shock and hence they face no direct incentive to run a surplus (either by 
cutting expenditures or increasing revenues), as this would mean moving away from their 
optimal levels SE  and ST . In this instance, as can be observed from (3.2b), the only 
fiscal instruments available to the centre are autonomous expenditure (D) and revenue (G). 
The policy instruments available to the centre to respond to macroeconomic shocks are 
more limited than under centralisation.   
 
In the following section we depart from these two polar cases and assess the level of 
effective central control in decentralised systems where the central government plays a 
key role in financing sub-central fiscal policy.    
 
 
 
3.4 Grant Finance
 
For simplicity, we assume that all sub-central revenues are raised from central 
government block grants (i.e. no autonomous revenue raising power). Thus, SR = SG.  
 
Under a system of grant finance, the level of grant assigned to the sub-central government 
is typically determined unilaterally by the centre, sometimes through needs assessment 
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mechanisms. However, more often than not, even such formulas are often highly 
dependent on the discretion of the centre  see IMF (1997). While in certain 
circumstances sub-central governments may have limited influence or bargaining power 
regarding their grant allocation, the ultimate decision on how much each sub-central 
government receives, typically remains the sole prerogative of the centre. Unlike 
revenues that arise as tax sharing revenues, revenues from intergovernmental grants are 
likely to be most subject to yearly central government discretion in their determination - 
Rodden (2003).  
 
To best capture this, we can interpret grant finance as a situation in which the centre 
raises an amount of revenue, via central taxation, to fund a pool of revenues (which we 
will denote X). In turn, it uses these revenues to fund transfers to sub-central tiers in the 
form of grant allocations (SG). At the outset, we assume that the amount the centre raises 
is fully transferred to the sub-centre (i.e. X = SG)13. Given the centres pre-determined 
preferences for SE, SE this yields:  
 
X SG SE       (4.1) 
when, SE SE t  
 
Provided that the optimal level of SE as viewed by the centre ( SE ) is less than or equal 
to the optimal level of SE as viewed by the sub-centre ( SE ), actual sub-central 
expenditure will equal SE . Otherwise the sub-centre would set SE = SE  and there would 
be a sub-central surplus of X - SE 14: 
X SG SE SE
X SE Ssurplus
 !  
  

     (4.1a) 
when, SE SE    
 
Under a system of grant financed sub-central expenditure the general government budget 
constraint can be re-written as  
                                                          
13 If X>SG at the outset,  the centre would be running a pointless surplus.  
14 One can reasonably expect that sub-central politicians optimal level of sub-central expenditure will 
be higher than that of central government politicians. Empirical evidence of the flypaper effect (see 
Hines and Thaler (1996) and Darby et al. (2005a)) shows that increases in grants bring about equal 
increases in expenditure, suggesting that the actual level of sub-central expenditure is lower than the 
optimal level from the viewpoint of sub-central governments. While the existence of targets and 
guidelines suggests that the centre  may be concerned about low expenditure in certain areas, for the 
most part, we would expect that sub-central preferences for total expenditure will be higher.  
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 G y X ybal      G M D E( ) ( ) SG   (4.2) 
 
If SE SE t , given 4.1, the budget constraint in equilibrium is identical to that under full 
decentralisation  i.e.: 
 
X SG SE       (4.1) 
 
Hence,  
G y y X
G y y X
G y y
bal
bal
bal
     
     
   
  [  ]
  [
 
G M D E
G M D E
G M D E
b g b g
b g b g
b g b g
SE
SG]  (4.3) 
 
While if SE SE  , given 4.1a:  
 
X SG SE SE
X SE Ssurplus
 !  
  

     (4.1a) 
 
the general government budget constraint becomes  
 
G y y Xbal      G M D Eb g b g [  ]SE  (4.4) 
 
Following a shock to output, as before both the central and general government fiscal 
balances move into deficit:  
 
( ) ( ) 0s sbalG y X y SEG M D E         (4.4a) 
 
As above, to balance the budget a consolidation is necessary. Clearly, one option for the 
centre is to adjust their own non-cyclical expenditure (D) and revenue (G). However, in 
contrast to the full autonomy case discussed above, there is now an important additional 
instrument they can exploit. Following the shock, the centre can drive a wedge between 
the money raised in the revenue pool assigned for sub-central grant transfers (X) and the 
actual level of grant (SG) transferred. That is, X SGz . Most importantly, by cutting the 
level of grant SG (while holding X constant), the central government can in effect 
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generate a fiscal surplus at the sub-central level which can be used to compensate for 
the deficit at the central level.  
 
To illustrate this point, consider the case where SE SE t - i.e. the perceived optimal sub-
central expenditure levels are higher for sub-central as oppose to central administrations. 
As discussed above, this corresponds to X SG SE  . Consequently, any reduction in 
SG (below X) will bring about a corresponding fall in SE (as the starting point SE  is 
below the sub-centrals optimal level of expenditure SE  and assuming single-peaked 
preferences). By reducing SG to SGnew and hence SE to SEnew, the central government can 
retain the difference XSGnew as a contribution to the consolidation attempt. Thus in 
effect, the central government can generate a cut in national expenditure for the same 
level of national revenue with the cut in expenditure being skewed to the sub-central tier. 
In an extreme case the government could set XSGnew such as to eliminate the general 
government deficit  i.e.  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0s s newbalG y y X SGG M D E         (4.4b) 
 
In essence, the centre is able to force the hand of the sub-central government to cut their 
expenditures. This result is consistent with empirical evidence. For example, in Darby et 
al. (2005b) strong evidence was found of central governments exploiting a reverse 
flypaper effect during national consolidation attempts by forcing sub-central 
governments to cut their expenditures by significantly tightening their grant allocations.  
 
Alternatively, by raising the amount of revenue located in the pool of resources for sub-
central transfers (X), provided that this increase in revenue is not passed on to the sub-
centre in the form of grants, the centre is again able to generate a surplus on sub-central 
finances15. That is, the centre could raise X to Xnew and keep SG constant, retaining the 
difference Xnew  SG as surplus. Of course in this case the burden of adjustment would no 
longer be borne by the sub-centre as SE would remain unaffected. In an extreme case the 
government could set Xnew  SG to be sufficient to eliminate the general government 
deficit generated by the output shock  i.e.  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0s s newbalG y y X SGG M D E         (1.6b) 
                                                          
15 Any increase in X , passed on to sub-central governments in the form of higher grants will 
automatically lead to a rise in sub-central expenditures SE.  
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 Thus under a system of expenditure decentralisation financed by grants, the centre's 
effective control of aggregate national fiscal policy resembles that under full 
centralisation. By raising X they can in effect increase sub-central revenues for a given 
level of national expenditure or by cutting SG force a cut to sub-central expenditure for a 
given level of national revenue.  
 
If SE SE  that is (4.1a), the level of grant exceeds optimal sub-central expenditures at 
the outset and hence the central government may use this sub-central surplus to contribute 
to their consolidation effort without any need to alter sub-central grants. They could of 
course increase this sub-central surplus by increasing the resources for sub-central 
transfers (X). To induce a cut in sub-central expenditures, grants would have to be cut by 
an amount such that SG < SE .  
 
Finally, note that when sub-central expenditures are financed by block grants, it is only 
the level of expenditure that can be controlled by the centre. The sub-centre will be able 
to alter the composition of this expenditure as they so wish. In contrast, if the grants are 
specific grants then the centre is able to control both the total size of adjustment and its 
composition. This can be useful when profligacy, in particular elements of sub-central 
fiscal policy, cause the central government concern or as found in Darby et al. (2005b) 
sub-central governments have a bias toward cutting priority spending areas such as capital 
expenditures during periods of consolidation.  
 
In summary, when sub-central expenditures are financed by grants, the level of central 
government effective control of national fiscal balances is similar to that under full 
centralisation. The centre is able to adjust not only their own expenditures and revenues 
but via manipulation of the grant system those of the sub-centre. In Section 3.5 we 
examine how this outcome differs to that observed under a system of tax sharing.  
 
3.5 Tax sharing 
 
As in the case of grants, we assume that the sub-centre receives its entire resource 
allocation from tax sharing revenues (i.e. they have no autonomous revenue raising 
power). Thus, SR = STshare. Further, in line with the majority of tax sharing arrangements 
(for example, Germany and Austria), the centre and the sub-centre are assumed to raise 
these 'shared' revenues from a common pool of resources with the shares assigned to each 
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tier of government pre-determined and fixed16. Thus for example, a 50:50 split requires 
that 50% of all revenues raised from shared tax source be allocated to the sub-centre with 
the centre retaining the remaining 50%.  
 
For simplicity we assume that the tax sharing arrangement is such that the common pool 
of resources is a non-cyclical revenue pool with the tax share division 1:0 in favour of the 
sub-centre17. In other words, all tax revenues received from this pool of resources are 
assigned to the sub-centre. Therefore, X (the pool of resources used to finance sub-central 
expenditure) equals STshare.
 
To remain consistent with our earlier discussions and like most tax sharing arrangements, 
we assume that the centre unilaterally controls the size of the pool of resources that the 
sub-centre receives via the tax sharing arrangement. Therefore, the centre determines both 
the tax base and tax rate and hence ultimately the total revenue raised. The sub-centre is 
assumed to have no authority over the raising and collection of these revenues. It is 
therefore, justifiable to view such revenues as purely a central to sub-central transfer of 
fiscal resources.  
 
For instance, given the centres pre-determined preferences for SE, SE , the centre can 
determine the appropriate tax base and rate that will give:  
 
ST SEshare       (5.1) 
provided, SE SE t . 
 
If the centre's optimal level of SE ( SE ) is less than or equal to the optimal level of SE 
as viewed by the sub-centre ( SE ), actual sub-central expenditure will equal SE . That is, 
the pool of resources assigned to the sub-centre equals the amount spent by the sub-centre 
ST SEshare  . Therefore, as under a system of grants (and full centralisation), the centre is 
able to determine the exact level of sub-central expenditure even if this falls short of what 
the sub-centre would ideally like. Moreover, by cutting STshare the centre can (just like 
under a system of grants) force the hand of the sub-centre to cut expenditure (SE). 
Clearly, in the alternative scenario where the centre's optimal level of SE ( SE ) exceeded 
                                                          
16 See Section 2 for a discussion.  
17 More complicated revenue splits (e.g. 75:25 etc) are possible but do not alter our analysis.    
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the sub-centre's optimal level ( SE ), sub-central politicians would set SE = SE  
generating a surplus equal to the difference STshare  SE : 
 
ST SE SE
ST SE S
share
share surplus
!  
  

     (5.1a) 
 
Therefore, at a first glance, tax sharing and grants appear identical. However, there are in 
fact important subtle differences which we outline below.  
 
Under a system of tax sharing the general government budget constraint 1.6 can be re-
written as  
 
G y ST ybal share     SEG M D E( ) ( )   (5.2) 
 
If SE SE t , the budget constraint is identical to that under full decentralisation  i.e.: 
 
ST SEshare       (5.1) 
Hence,  
G ybal    G M D Eb g b gy    (5.3) 
 
While if SE SE  , given 5.1a:  
 
    (5.1a) 
ST SE SE
ST SE S
share
share surplus
!  
  


 
the general government budget constraint becomes  
 
G y y STbal share     G M D Eb g b g [  ]SE  (5.4) 
 
As above, suppose there is a negative shock to output and both the central and general 
government fiscal balances (5.2) move into deficit:  
 
( ) ( ) 0s sbal shareG y ST y SEG M D E        (5.5) 
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As in the previous examples, one option open to the centre is to adjust their own non-
cyclical expenditure (D) and revenue (G). However, unlike the situation of grants (or 
indeed full centralisation) these are likely to be the only policy options available. Why? 
 
Under a system of tax sharing with fixed pre-determined shares, provided that SE SE t  
(the most realistic case), the centre is unable to alter their fiscal instruments/elements of 
sub-central control in such a manner that would generate a sub-central fiscal surplus. 
While the centre can 'force the hand' of the sub-centre to determine the actual level of 
expenditure they cannot force the creation of a fiscal surplus.  
 
To illustrate this, when SE SE t  this corresponds to ST SEshare   (so ) and 
the general government balance can be re-written as:  
SE STshare !
 
( ) ( ) 0s sbal shareG y ST y SEG M D E        (5.6) 
 
Suppose the centre tried to increase the pool of resources from which STshare is drawn 
from (i.e. increase X to Xnew), keeping the STshare constant and hence retaining the 
additional revenue for itself (i.e. XnewSTshare). In effect, this can be seen as an attempt to 
drive a wedge between the pool of resources for sub-central transfers (X) and the amount 
actually redistributed (STshare). Such action is however, not possible without the central 
government violating the tax sharing agreement (which requires that the share of revenues 
from the common pool distributed between the central and sub-central tiers remain fixed). 
While the centre has full authority to alter the size and composition of the common pool 
of resources used in the tax sharing arrangement, it cannot alter the shares assigned to 
each tier. In our case the tax share was assumed to be set at 1:0 in favour of the sub-centre 
(so X = STshare at all times). If the centre retained an amount of this additional revenue, 
their share of the shared tax would be non-zero.  
If , any attempt to raise revenues by increasing STSE STshare ! share will fail to improve the 
general government balance (Gbal). The increase in STshare would be matched by a 
compensating increase in SE as sub-central politicians more closely align actual 
expenditure with their own desired expenditure SE 18. Thus, any sub-central fiscal surplus 
generated from increased revenues would be cancelled out by the increased expenditures. 
                                                          
18 This implication is discussed in De Mello (2000). He points out that in the case of revenue sharing 
arrangements, every time a central government raises taxes to improve its own fiscal position, sub-
national governments receive a corresponding revenue benefit which they are free to spend. 
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In effect, if  then up to the point where SE STshare ! ST SEshare  the general government 
budget balance (5.6) can be re-written as: 
 
    0s sbalG y yG M D E         (5.7) 
 
Therefore, the fiscal instruments available to the central government are limited to their 
own autonomous expenditure (D) and revenue (G). Note that this is identical to the 
situation under full decentralisation.  Ultimately, if  then any increase in 
ST
ST SEshare  
share would improve Gbal as the additional revenues would no longer be spent on higher 
expenditures as optimality (from the viewpoint of sub-central politicians) has been 
reached. As mentioned above however, if SE  exceeds ST SEshare   by a substantial 
amount, this option may be unrealistic.  
 
An alternative strategy for the centre instead of increasing revenue, is to force the hand 
of the sub-centre to cut their expenditures. We can apply the same reasoning in the case 
of grants in so far as the centre can cut STshare. While this will bring about a 
corresponding fall in SE (as the starting point SE  is below the sub-centrals optimal level 
of expenditure SE ), in turn it implies a cut in national revenue given the pre-determined 
fixed tax shares (i.e. X = STshare). Therefore, both X and STshare must fall. The two effects 
(cut in expenditure and cut in revenue) cancel each other out, leading to no improvement 
in the general government deficit (Gbal). Therefore, under a system of tax sharing with 
pre-determined or fixed tax shares, the centre cannot force a cut in sub-central 
expenditures for a given level of national revenue.  
 
It is clear that this result is driven by the assumption of pre-determined or fixed tax 
shares. If the centre could unilaterally alter the revenue split between themselves and sub-
central governments (i.e. X  STshare) then a similar outcome to grants would be reached. 
In the context of the above analysis, the centre would be able to drive a wedge between 
the total amount raised (X) and the amount allocated to the sub-centre (STshare). 
However as previously discussed, the revenue splits from tax sharing are fixed in the vast 
majority of cases and in fact without fixed shares, the primary advantage of tax sharing 
over grant finance (i.e. improved incentives for local politicians) would be lost.  
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As an important aside, central governments may more generally be less willing to 
interfere with revenues from tax sharing arrangements than with grant allocations. This is 
for reasons similar to those highlighted above in our discussion on revenue splits from tax 
sharing which are almost universally kept fixed. It is argued that the revenue raised from 
tax sharing is often interpreted as having been earned by a particular region/government 
while grants on the other hand, create the appearance of funding by non-residents. This is 
especially likely to be the case if the shared tax-base is income or corporation profits; two 
of the most commonly shared taxes. In short, being seen to take resources from a 
particular region as opposed to reducing resources given to this region can be interpreted 
quite differently by voters19. For example, one of the main motivations behind the 
decision to share revenues from income tax in Norway, was to encourage sub-central 
governments to increase their tax base by implementing good government in order to 
gain from high revenues in the future20. Consequently, attempts to reduce the revenues 
sub-central central governments receive from this tax sharing have been strongly resisted 
and have the potential to be politically damaging.    
 
Returning to our analysis, if SE SE  (i.e. optimal sub-central expenditures were less 
than the centre would like) any increase in STshare to STshare
new could lead to an automatic 
improvement in Gbal. In this situation, the increase in revenue would fail to generate an 
increase in sub-central expenditure as it is already at optimum. The difference between 
the new higher STshare
new and SE  could be retained as surplus (i.e. STsharenew  SE ). In an 
extreme case the government could set STshare
new  SE  to be sufficient to eliminate the 
general government deficit generated by the output shock  i.e.  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0s s newbal shareG y y ST SEG M D E         (5.8) 
 
However, it is still the case that the centre is unable to bring about a cut in sub-central 
expenditures without altering STshare. In this case, a cut in SE will only occur when STshare 
falls by a sufficiently large amount such as to generate . Once again, with 
fixed tax shares, any attempt by the centre to cut sub-central expenditure requires a 
corresponding fall in national revenue. 
ST SEshare  
                                                          
19 The Fiscal Illusion literature argues that certain types of fiscal policy may be viewed differently by 
the private sector even if they have the same effect on the economy. For a discussion and theoretical 
application to intergovernmental grants see Oates (1979).  
20 See IMF (1997).  
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 It is clear that tax sharing and grant based sub-central financing systems imply very 
different degrees of effective central government control over national fiscal policy. Only 
in the special and probably unrealistic case of optimal expenditure from the perspective of 
sub-central politicians being less than that which the central government would like, can 
sub-central balances be used to assist in any consolidation attempt. Even then, any 
adjustment is limited to increases in sub-central revenue. This outcome is more akin to 
the situation under full decentralisation than under grants21.  
 
The tax sharing structure that we have outlined in the above is such that the sub-central 
government has no control to alter the tax rate or the tax base. As mentioned earlier, in 
certain countries sub-central governments are able to set (within limits) an autonomous 
tax rate on a tax base which they share with the centre  i.e. piggy-back taxes. For 
example, the system of income tax sharing common in Scandinavian countries. In 
practice, nearly all sub-central governments set their tax rates at the centrally determined 
ceiling level  see Joumard, and Suyker (2002). With this form of tax sharing the 
analysis discussed above still holds. In order to increase sub-central taxation revenues the 
centre must lift the ceiling level so that the sub-centre can set a higher tax rate, however 
if the ceiling was binding, the ability to raise higher revenues will lead to increased 
expenditures. On the other hand, a cut in sub-central expenditure would require a 
lowering of the ceiling however, this would lead to a fall in sub-central and hence by 
implication, national revenues22. Therefore, an identical result is reached; the central 
governments ability to manipulate sub-central fiscal policy for national adjustment is 
relatively constrained.   
 
In summary, through using some simple budgetary accounting we have shown that there 
is an important difference between grants and tax sharing in the context of a national 
consolidation attempt. Under a system of grant finance the central government is able to 
'force the hand' of the sub-centre to cut their expenditures for a given level of national 
revenue. This is not possible in a tax sharing system as any attempt to lower sub-central 
expenditure requires a reduction in national revenue. Thus, while a system of grants can 
                                                          
21 Moreover, revenues from tax sharing are almost always block transfers and are not tied to specific 
elements of expenditure. Therefore, unlike specific grants the centre is unable to control either the level 
or composition of expenditure.   
22 A similar result holds under the UK system of capping local authorities council tax bills. Capping 
alone will be insufficient to assist any consolidation as any curtailment of revenue will only bring 
expenditure in line with this new level of revenue.  
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be closely aligned to a system of full centralisation, a tax sharing arrangement 
substantially reduces the de facto power of the central government to consolidate national 
fiscal policy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The presence of vertical imbalances and intergovernmental transfers, imply that central 
governments retain a degree of de facto control over sub-central fiscal policy that would 
not be possible under complete fiscal decentralisation. While there are clearly issues of 
diluted local responsibility and accountability, central control can be beneficial in 
preventing fiscally profligate sub-central authorities from de-stabilising the national 
economy. Of more direct relevance to this paper, central control can be advantageous 
during periods of economic reform or adjustment. Ultimately, the balance between these 
two concerns has to be assessed relative to the political and economic factors of a 
particular country and/or region.  
 
It is clear that any relationship between tiers of government depends critically upon the 
financial linkages that exist between them. The current consensus in the literature has 
been that intergovernmental transfers whether they stem from a block grant, matching 
grant or tax sharing, imply a similar degree of central control over sub-central fiscal 
policy. In this paper however, we have shown that this is not the case. While many of the 
differences between full centralisation and decentralisation are obvious, the contrasts 
between grants and tax sharing are more subtle. While we recognise, and do not dispute, 
the identified similarities between grants and tax sharing in terms of the freedom of sub-
central governments to pursue their own fiscal policy strategies, our analysis reveals 
important differences in the level of central control. With grants central governments are 
able to force the hand of sub-central governments not only to make expenditure cuts but 
to run a fiscal surplus. Under tax sharing, only the former is possible. This asymmetry 
implies that tax sharing regimes have a lower degree of de facto central control than grant 
systems. The exception to this rule is when the centre has the capacity to alter the revenue 
split between tiers during the setting of the annual budget. However, as discussed in the 
text, this scenario is not only uncommon but would work against the very benefits of 
efficiency and accountability which tax sharing systems provide.   
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In addition to providing important implications for academic research, such as guidance 
on appropriate comparisons of decentralisation levels across countries, our analysis has 
practical implications for the design of fiscal institutions. Both tax sharing and grants 
represent a reduction in sub-central financial autonomy relative to full tax autonomy. 
However, switching from grant finance to tax sharing (as is advocated by some 
economists in the UK  see Hallwood and MacDonald (2005)) would represent a 
reduction in central government control of sub-central and by implication national fiscal 
policy. Therefore, the widely documented gains from improved sub-central efficiencies 
under tax sharing may be offset by a loss of macroeconomic control.  We believe that a 
fuller discussion of these potential tradeoffs is required prior to any institutional or 
financial reform.  
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